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WHAT WILL THE
TOWER RESEARCH
CAPITAL II RULING
MEAN FOR CFTC
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS AGAINST
NON-U.S. FIRMS?
By Professor Emeritus Ronald Filler
Ronald Filler is a Professor Emeritus
and the Chair of the Ronald H. Filler
Institute on Financial Services Law at
New York Law School (“NYLS”). He has
taught courses on Derivatives Law, Securities Regulation, the Regulation of
Broker-Dealers and FCMs and other
financial law issues since 1977 at four
different U.S. law schools. Prof. Filler is
a Public Director of the National
Futures Association, a Public Director
and Member and Chair of the Regulatory Oversight Committee (“ROC”) of
Swap-Ex, a swap execution facility
owned by the State Street Corp. and has
served on a number of boards of various
exchanges, clearing houses and industry
trade associations. Before joining the
NYLS faculty in 2008, he was a Managing Director in the Capital Markets
Prime Services Division at Lehman
Brothers Inc. in its New York
headquarters. Prof. Filler has coauthored, with Prof. Jerry Markham,
“Regulation of Derivative Financial
Instruments (Swaps, Options and
Futures).” Prof. Filler provides expert
witness testimony and consulting services relating to a variety of issues
involving the financial services industry.
You can reach Prof. Filler via email at:
ronald.filler@nyls.edu

INTRODUCTION
In 2018, in a highly controversial and
unusual opinion, Judge Kimba Wood,
writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held in Tower Research Capital that the matching of trades
at night on the CME Globex platform of
the KOSPI 200 Futures Contracts traded
on the Korea Exchange (“KRX”) gave
five Korean traders the right to bring a
“spoofing” allegation against Tower Research Capital (“Tower”), a hedge fund.1
The opinion noted that Tower traded
4,000,000 trades of the KOSPI contract
on Globex in 2012, which represented approximately 54% of the market share,
whereas these five Korean traders traded
1,000 such contracts in 2012.2 All of the
trades at issue were deemed to be “night
trades.” For the KOSPI contract, even
though it is cleared at KRX, the CME
agreed to allow KRX to use its CME
Globex platform to execute and “match”
these night trades as the KRX did not offer any night trading platforms.3 The federal district court in this first Tower Research Capital case had issued two
decisions,4 both of which denied the plaintiffs’ claims, citing Morrison.5 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
then remanded the case back to the district
court.
The plaintiffs had alleged “spoofing” by
the defendants as their large market share
and high frequency trading allegedly
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caused injury to the plaintiffs.6 Even though the
plaintiffs could not prove that the defendants
were on the opposite side of any of their KOSPI
orders placed via Globex, they argued that, given
the fact that the defendants placed 4,000,000
orders on Globex in 2012, statistically, one or
more of the plaintiffs’ orders had to be matched
by the defendants.
In Morrison, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b), or SEC Rule
10b-5, does not apply to extraterritorial securities
transactions unless it can be proven that such
transactions were listed on a domestic exchange.7
Morrison was strictly a securities case and did
not involve the Commodity Exchange Act
(“CEA”), 7 U.S.C. A. § 1 et seq., or any regulation promulgated by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”). The district
court in the first Tower Research Capital (“TRC”)
case, citing Morrison, reasoned that the defendants’ alleged conduct was within the territorial
reach of the CEA only if the KOSPI contracts
were purchased or sold in the United States or
were listed on a domestic exchange.8 The district
court in the first TRC case noted that the KOSPI
orders were placed in Korea, and not in the U.S.,
and the fact that they were merely matched on
Globex, which is located in Illinois, were final
only when cleared the next day in South Korea.9
This district court then held that, while the CME
is a domestic exchange, its Globex platform is
not.10 Therefore, no trading took place on a “domestic” exchange.
The Second Circuit in the first TRC case, as
noted above, then remanded the case back to the
district court for further deliberation. In the
second TRC district court case, the defendants
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had filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that its
trading of the KOSPI 200 was not subject to the
rules of any registered entity as required by Section 9 of the CEA.11 The plaintiffs filed a second
amended complaint and then moved for summary
judgment. In December 2019, a magistrate recommended that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted On May 11,
2020, the district court entered a summary judgment against the plaintiffs’ claims in the second
TRC case, finding that “Tower’s overnight trading of KOSPI 200 futures was not ‘subject to the
rules of [a] registered entity’ as required by Section 9 of the CEA.”12

BACKGROUND
The Second Circuit in TRC II reasoned that:
1. The KOSPI 200 is an index of two hundred
Korean stocks traded on the KRX, a securities and derivatives exchange headquartered in Busan, South Korea.
2. During daytime hours, orders for KOSPI
200 futures are placed and matched on the
KRX in South Korea.
3. During overnight hours, orders for KOSPI
200 futures are placed on the KRX in South
Korea but are matched with a counterparty
on CME Globex located in Illinois.
4. Unlike the KRX, CME Globex is not an
exchange but merely provides a tradematching engine used by both U.S. and
non-U.S. exchanges.13
The Second Circuit in TRC II affirmed the
summary judgment granted by the district court
in this second TRC case.14
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ANALYSIS OF THIS OPINION

sions of the CEA that require exchanges to “establish, monitor and enforce” their rules.20 It held
that “absent an affirmative statement to the contrary, trading in a futures contract is confined to,
and regulated by, the exchange that creates it.”21
It then stated:

While the prior Second Circuit decision in
2018 gave some hope that the plaintiffs had a
right to bring an action against the defendants,
this more recent Second Circuit decision clearly
negated any such expectations, especially if no
“registered entity” was involved in the transactions at issue. The Second Circuit relied on the
literal language of Section 9 of the CEA and
stated that, to find a claim of manipulation or attempted manipulation, the transaction must be
“subject to the rules of a registered entity.”15 It
then stated: “(n)either the KRX nor the CME
Globex is a registered entity under the CEA.”16
The plaintiffs had argued that the overnight
trading of the KOSPI 200 was in fact subject to
the rules of the CME, a registered entity.17 The
Second Circuit then stated:
“First, the CME Rulebook—the source of the
CME’s rules—specifies that it applies only to
futures contracts that are created by and listed on
the CME itself. It states that its rules apply to
trading and clearing of ‘Exchange’ futures and
defined ‘Exchange’ exclusively as the ‘Chicago
Mercantile Exchange.’ It is undisputed that
KOSPI 200 futures are not CME futures; they
are KRX futures created and listed on the KRX.
If there were any doubt, the CME Rules explicitly
lists hundreds of CME futures contracts subject
to its rules. Nothing on that list mentions KOSPI
200 futures - let alone the KRX.”18
“Second, both the CME and its parent, CME
Group, Inc, have confirmed that the CME does
not regulate the trading of KOSPI 200 futures,
even when trades are matched using CME
Globex and . . .. ‘CME does not regulate, review
or monitor the trading activity that occurs in the
KOSPI Futures contracts as such activity is done
by the Korea Exchange.’ ’’19

The Second Circuit then addressed the provi-
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“Moreover, linking KOSPI 200 futures to Chapter 5 of the CME Rulebook—which plaintiffs
claim governs all trading through CME Globex—
would yield absurd results.”22
“Plaintiffs’ theory would require us to conclude
that any futures contract matched on CME
Globex is regulated by every exchange with rules
governing the use of the platform. A CBOT trade
would thus be subject to the rules of the CBOT,
but also the rules of the CME, the NYMEX, the
COMEX, and perhaps even the KRX.”23

The Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (“SIFMA”) filed an amicus brief
before the Second Circuit arguing that the plaintiffs were improperly allowed to plead unjust
enrichment under New York law before the
district court based on mere allegations of market
manipulation without first alleging a direct trading relationship with the defendants.24
As noted above, Tower Research Capital had
traded approximately 4,000,000 KOSPI 200
contracts, which was a rather large market share.
The plaintiffs had argued that, based on this large
position, Tower Research Capital statistically had
to be a counterparty to some of its trades. SIFMA
argued that the plaintiffs must prove a direct relationship between the counterparties citing In Re
Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litigation.25
The district court in TRC II did not rule on
plaintiff’s state law claim of unjust enrichment
so this issue was thus not addressed by the Second
Circuit.
The plaintiffs then raised three other argu-
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ments, none of which were accepted by the
Second Circuit, and none of which apply directly
to the requirement of trading on a registered
entity, and thus are not addressed here.
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nition of as registered entity as noted above? The
answers to these and other questions remain
open.

CONCLUSION
IMPACT OF THIS CASE ON
FUTURE CFTC ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS
In its decision, the Second Circuit clearly
emphasized the need to find a “registered entity”
in order for Section 9 of the CEA to apply. Section 9(1) states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, to use or apply, . . .
in connection with any swap or a contract of sale
of any commodity . . ., subject to the rules of
any registered entity, . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device . . . .”26 Section 1(40) of the
CEA defines the term “registered entity” as,
among other things, a “board of trade designated
as a contract market under Section 7 of the CEA”
or “with respect to a contract that the Commission determines is a significant price discovery
contract, . . . . or any electronic trading facility
on which the contract is executed or traded.”27 A
significant price discovery contract deals with
clearing of swaps.28 While TRC II was strictly a
civil proceedings between two private parties,
this opinion could have impact on future CFTC
enforcement proceedings as well.
How will this case impact future CFTC enforcement actions brought against a non-U.S.
firm? Will there be a requirement to find that any
such non-U.S. firm violates the CEA only if the
non-U.S. firm falls within the definition of a
“registered entity?” What about trading platform
located outside the U.S. that allow U.S. persons
to trade via the internet on them? Will these
electronic trading platforms fall within the defi-
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To me, the TRC II case may in fact hinder
CFTC’s efforts to bring enforcement actions
against non-U.S. persons and firms. It also means
that U.S. persons trading on non-U.S. exchanges
pursuant to Part 30 of the CFTC rules may not be
able to bring a civil action before a federal district
court. Query, should the CFTC amend Part 30 to
require more disclosure language to protect U.S.
persons as a result of this case? We shall see how
case law will develop in this area.
©Ronald H. Filler
ENDNOTES:
1

Myun-Uk Choi et al v. Tower Research Capital LLC et al., No. 17-648-cv (2d Cir., March 29,
2018). The Second Circuit decision was an appeal from a Motion to Dismiss at the federal
district court level. See also “Ask the Professor—
What is the Impact of the Recent Second Circuit
Decision in Tower Research Capital on the
Global Futures Markets?,” 38 Fut. Der. L. Rep.
Issue 6, June 2018, which was written by this
author. That article addressed the implications of
the Morrison and other related cases.
2
Please note that these 4,000,000 contracts
represented actual fills whereas most “spoofing”
cases imply that orders are not executed but are
cancelled before any such execution.
3
CME Globex allows traders to place orders
on its platform for a large variety of underlying
financial products traded on several different exchanges which are then “matched” with other
traders so that the orders are executed at a confirmed quantity and price. The respective orders
are then forwarded to the respective exchange or
clearing house to be finalized or cleared depend-

K 2021 Thomson Reuters

Futures and Derivatives Law Report
ing on the underlying arrangement.
4
Myun-Uk Choi et al. v. Tower Research
Capital, Ltd. et al, 165 F. Supp. 3d 42 (S.D.N.Y
2016) and 232 F. Supp. 3d 337 (S.D.N.Y 2017),
Docket No. 14-cv- 09912.
5
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247 (2010). Morrison was decided two
months before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act. See also, Ronald H. Filler & Jerry W.
Markham, REGULATION OF DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS (SWAPS, OPTIONS, AND FUTURES) CASES
AND MATERIALS, Chapter 12 (2014) (describing
the Morrison case).
6
Supra, n.4.
7
Supra, n.5 at 267. See also supra, n.4.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 49.
10
Id.
11
7 U.S.C.A. § 9(1), (3).
12
Myun-Uk Choi et al. v. Tower Research
Capital, LLC et al., Second Circuit, No- 20-1648cv, June 22, 2021, at p. 3-8. See also Myun-Uk
Choi v. Tower Research Capital, LLC, et al. No.
14 Civ 9912, 2020 WL. 231763 at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y.

K 2021 Thomson Reuters

September 2021 | Volume 41 | Issue 8
May 11, 2020).
13
Id at 4.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 9.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 10.
19
Id. at 10-11.
20
7 U.S.C.A. § 7(d)(2)(A)(ii).
21
Supra, n. 11, at 12.
22

Id.

23

Id at 12-13.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association in
Support of Defendants’ Appellees’ Petition for
Panel Rehearing.
25
Id. at 3-5. See also 730 F.3d 170, 173 (2d
Cir. 2013).
26
7 U.S.C.A. § 9(1).
24

27

7 U.S.C.A. 1(40).

28

7 U.S.C.A. 2(h).

5

